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Abstract 
Structural funds are the most intensively used policy instrument by the European Union to 
promote economic growth in its member states and to speed up the process of convergence. 
This paper empirically explores the effectiveness of European Structural Funds by means of a 
panel data analysis for 13 countries in the European Union. We show that – on average – 
Structural Funds are ineffective. For countries with high-quality institutions, however, 
Structural Funds are effective. This result is obtained for several proxies for institutional 
quality and is robust for different estimation techniques (OLS, period- and country-specific 
fixed effects and dynamic panel data models). 
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1. Introduction 
Structural Funds are the most important policy instrument used by the European Union (EU) 
to promote regional development of its member stats and o speed up the process of 
convergence. It covers about a third of the total EU budget. An important question is how 
effective these funds are in promoting economic growth and reducing welfare differences in 
the EU. In the light of the upcoming enlargement of the EU this question becomes even more 
pressing. This paper aims at empirically investigating this question.  
This paper relates to a large literature that evaluates the effectiveness of the European 
cohesion policy. Basically, three evaluation meth ds are used: model simulation, case studies 
and econometric evaluation. For a recent review of the different economic evaluation 
methods, we refer to Ederveen et al. (2002). The econometric evaluations, to which this study 
belongs, consist of analyses of regional economic growth (see, for example, Boldrin and 
Canova, 2001; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2003) or studies that examine the impact of cohesion 
policy within one specific country (see, for example, De la Fuente and Vives, 1995, on 
Spain). This paper complements the class of econometric evaluations by performing a cross-
country panel data analysis.2  
The country-level analysis has important merits. First – in contrast to regional growth 
regressions – the analysis is not sensitive to leakage or spillover effects. Spillover effects 
occur, for example, when a backward region improves its infrastructure, while as a 
consequence a construction firm in a wealthy neighbouring region experiences a positive 
demand shock. Second, the allocation of funds across regions might be sensitive to crowding 
out (national government change the allocation of their support to backward regions in 
response to receipts from the EU). The analysis on the effectiveness of the EU support on a 
regional level is troubled by such a mecanism; the country-level analysis on the contrary is 
insensitive for this. Third, a country level analysis allows to control for variables that are 
unavailable at the regional level. Obvious examples are educational attainment rates, which 
are only reliable on a country level, and institutional quality variables, which are not available 
on a regional level. Fourth, regional growth analyses suffer from severe selection problems. 
A country-level analysis substantially lessens this problem. As Structural Funds are llocated 
to regions in a non-ra dom way – the funds are allocated to regions that are relatively poor – 
                                         
2 The only other paper using pooled cross-se ti n analysis that we are aware of is Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 
(2003). Compared to our study, their analysis covers a shorter time span and lacks a clear link with theoretically 
based econometric growth studies.  
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the regional growth analysis suffers from an endogeneity problem. Given that all countries 
have regions that are relatively poor, even from a European point of view, this endogeneity 
problem (which is otherwise hard to solve) is much less of a problem.
In its approach, this paper bears close similarity with Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
They assess the effectiveness of aid on growth with a focus on less developed countries. 
Their major result is that aid is at best conditionally effective: only countries with relatively 
solid domestic policies are positively affected by aid. They measure good policies by an 
openness variable capturing among others the black-market premium, inflation and the 
budget deficit (cf. Sachs and Warner, 1995). In a related paper, Gallup et al. (1999) show that 
locational factors are relevant in explaining growth differences. Their basic argument is that 
landlocked regions are more vulnerable to policy-induced inefficient allocations of scarce 
resources as opposed to open regions.  
Building on these ideas, this paper aims to assess whether Structural Funds are 
effective, and what conditions affect the effectiveness. The paper has two majo  re ults. First, 
we show that Structural Funds as such do not explain growth differentials among the Member 
States. Second, however, Structural Funds allocated to the most open economies and/or to 
economies with ‘good’ institutions are effective. The quality of institutions will – in the 
context of this study – be proxied by several quantitative measures, including corruption, 
inflation, openness, etc. Hence, EU support is conditionally effective. 
Apart from assessing the (conditional) effectiveness of Structural Funds and the type 
of conditions that are important, this paper contributes to the literature on growth more 
generally. Especially, by focussing on support to countries in the European Union, the paper 
adds to the literature on the conditionality of aid that has so far focussed on aid to less 
developed countries instead of developed countries (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000).3  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background of the model 
that we estimate. Section 3 presents the basic regression results, whereas section 4 explores a 
wide variety of institutional variables. Section 5 examines the robustness of the results. The 
conclusions are contained in Section 6.  
  
                                         
3 In addition, we find that the augmented neoclassical model – the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992; hereinafter 
MRW) version – is well suited to describe European growth. In establishing this result, we make use of the new 
data on human capital constructed by Doménech and De la Fuente (2000).  
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2. Theoretical Considerations 
The aim of this section is to provide the theoretical background for the empirical analysis that 
will follow. In doing so, we avoid developing a full-fledged theoretical model. For such a 
model, we refer to Burnside and Dollar (1997) who have shown how aid can 
straightforwardly be incorporated in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model.  
The major variable of interest for this study is the amount of Structural Funds (SF) 
received by a country. In analysing the effectiveness of these Structural Funds in stimulating 
growth, it is important to realise (i) that the Structural Funds can be seen as an income 
transfer, (ii) the Structural Funds have to be co-funded by the receiving country, and (iii) that 
the funds often have to be spent on pre-specified projects. Given these characteristics, it is 
impossible to formulate an unambiguous hypothesis on the expected effect of Structural 
Funds on economic growth. Depending on the circumstances, the effect can be positive, 
negative or zero. If aid by means of the provision of Structural Funds would be seen as an 
unconditional transfer, GDP of an economy that is located on the production frontier would 
not be affected and the expected coefficient is zero.4 We can rule this out, however, as the EU 
requires the Structural Funds to be invested. The basic hypothesis in a neoclassical 
framework would hence be that the Structural Funds would foster economic growth as they 
increase the rate of investments. Three important reservations have to be made, however. 
First, the funds are often required to b  invested in specific projects. These projects need not 
be growth promoting, but might – for example – enhance cultural or environmental values. 
Furthermore, these projects can absorb complementary factors such as human capital that 
would otherwise be allocated towards potentially more attractive activities in terms of 
growth. Second, the Structural Funds have to be co-funded by domestic tax revenues. In case 
taxation is highly distortionary, the net growth effect may well be negative. Third, corruption 
may take funds away from productive activities.  
The bottom line of this discussion is that the Structural Funds are at best conditionally 
effective. These conditions determine the type of project that is financed by means of the 
Structural Funds, the distort ons resulting from the required co-funding, and the potential 
distortions in the allocation of production factors. In operationalising these ideas, we assume 
that the effectiveness of investments depends on the ‘institutional quality’ of the receiving 
country. Though the literature on growth convincingly argues that ‘institutions matter’, the 
                                         
4 GNP is affected immediately. 
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operationalisation of the concept is more controversial. The details of our operalisation can be 
found in the data appendix, but in this section we discuss the theoretical considerations 
behind the indicators. 
In assuming the Structural Funds to be conditionally effective, the basic idea is that 
resources can be allocated either toward productive activities or to ‘rent-s eking’ activities 
and that the set of rules and institutions in a country determines this allocation. The 
effectiveness of Structural Funds might thus depend on this allocation andthe S ructural 
Funds might even affect this allocation. Let us give three concrete examples of how this 
could work. First, Structural Funds could provide attractive, profitable options for public 
officials to obtain private benefits, in case of a lack of accountability. Murphy et al. (1991) 
show that increased opportunities for rent seeking might induce an allocation of talent that is 
harmful to economic growth. Second, barriers to international trade cause an inefficient 
allocation of resources and can provide ample opportunities for diversion activities; 
extracting part of the duty payments might, for example, raise the net benefit of a 
customhouse official (see Hall and Jones, 1997).5 Alternatively, less open economies 
typically experience less policy-c mpetition on politicians and they might therefore be 
induced to listen ‘better’ to interest groups. Therefore closed economie ’ institutional quality 
tends to be worse. Third, for the allocation of the Structural Funds between productive and 
unproductive projects, more efficient transactions in the market support productive activities. 
For efficient market transactions, contract enforcement is crucial. Corruption and low 
bureaucratic quality undermine this. Alternatively, as Knack and Keefer (1997) argue, trust is 
important to overcome contractual incompleteness. Building on these theoretical ideas, we 
will select several proxies that we use as conditionality factors to analyse the effectiveness of 
Structural Funds in promoting economic growth and convergence.  
 
3. Regression results 
Given the aspects that we have argued to be relevant in analysing the effectiveness of 
Structural Funds, we estimate the following pooled cross-s ction regression equation: 
 
ititititAitithitkitit SFCONDSFgnssycg e+b+b+d++b+b+b+b+= 654,3,21 )ln()ln()ln( , 
                                         
5 Though it can be optimal to set a positive tariff if a country has market power, setting a tariff could create 
lucrative opportunities for rent seeking. 
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where the dependent variable git is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
over the period under consideration.6 Like in the standard MRW-framework, we include as 
explanatory variables initial GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars (yit), the average gross 
domestic savings rate (sk,it), the rate of human capital accumulation (sh,it), the population 
growth rate (ni), the exogenous rate of technological progress (gA), and the rate of 
depreciation (d). Most of these variables are taken from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2000). Our proxy for human capital is taken from Doménech and De la Fuente 
(2000). A more detailed discussion of sources and definitions of all the data is relegated to 
Appendix A. In measuring European aid, we restrict attention to the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). This is by far the most important of the funds and especially 
meant to help relatively poor EU members. In the regression equation, we use the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the amount of Structural Funds as a fraction of GDP,7 indicated by the 
variable SFi. Finally, CONDi denotes a conditionality factor capturing the institutional quality 
of the country. We will specify this variable later in this section in greater detail. 
We use data for thirteen EU countries8 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
Our panel data set covers seven five-year periods from 1960–1965 through 1990–1995. 
Following Islam (1995), an observation in our data set is thus capturing a country’s 
performance averaged over a five-year period. 
As is standard in the growth literature, we take gA+d to be equal to 5% for all 
countries and time periods (see, e.g., MRW). Note that by putting b5=b6=0, we have the 
standard neoclassical growth model as introduced and empirically estimated in a cross-
country context by MRW (1992) and later extended to a panel-data context by Islam (1995).9 
As a point of reference, we first estimate this basic MRW-model. The results are presented in 
                                         
6 For a period of T years starting at t=t0, we define the growth rate of a variable x s gt0 = [ ln(xto+T ) – ln(xto) ] /T. 
7 We add 1 to the share of Structural Funds as a fraction of GDP because this share can be zero and we want to 
include the natural logarithm of structural funds in the regression equation. 
8  We do not include Germany, because of the structural break in the data due to unification, and Luxembourg, 
because human capital data are unavailable. 
9 In most of our regression analysis, we do not use country- and period specific fixed effects for two reasons: 
first, we use institutional variables that have no – or at best very limited – time-series variation and, second, 
fixed effects do not ‘explain’ growth economically but only statistically, and thereby essentially capture ‘the 
measure of our ignorance’. However, in order to check for the robustness of the results that we present, we have 
performed the analyses including country- and period specific effects. The results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5. Similarly, we report the results obtained by application of the dynamic panel data model estimation 
techniques as developed by Arrelano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
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the first column of Table 3.1 and are consistent with theoretical predictions.10 Furtherm re, 
the null hypothesis that the parameters for sk and sh sum to the negative of the parameter for 
the population growth is not rejected. Therefore, in the second column we show the results of 
the restricted regression. From these results, we can infer the rate of convergence and the 
production elasticities of physical and human capital (corresponding to the respective capital 
income shares). These values are 0.027, 0.292 and 0.292.11 The rate of convergence is 
slightly higher than the OECD estimates obtained by MRW. The capital income share of 0.29 
is fairly close to the common sense value of one-third. Th  results thus support the validity of 
the augmented neoclassical growth model in explaining economic growth in EU countries. 
To assess the effectiveness of European cohesion policy, we start by including the 
variable SF in the basic regression. The other parameters are hardly influenced by this, as can 
be seen from the results in the third column of Table 3.1. The impact of the Structural Funds 
itself is not significant. If anythi g, Structural Funds are found to have a negative impact on 
economic growth. 
 
Table 3.1  Regression results 
 Basic Restricted Basic with SF SF and 
Institutional 
Quality 
Initial GDP per capita  –0.028  (5.3) –0.026  (5.5) –0.028  (5.4) –0.028  (5.5) 
Log of investments  0.020  (2.1) 0.018  (2.0) 0.018  (1.9) 0.020  (2.2) 
Log of human capital 0.023  (1.9) 0.018  (1.7) 0.023  (1.9) 0.022  (1.8) 
Log of population growth + 0.05 –0.023  (1.2)  –0.030  (1.4) –0.024  (1.2) 
Structural Funds   –0.015  (1.2) –0.141  (3.2) 
Structural Funds * Institutional Quality     0.018  (2.6) 
Constant 0.202  (3.6) 0.158  (4.9) 0.190  (3.3) 0.208  (3.6) 
     
R2-adj. 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.51 
# panel observations 91 91 91 91 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-s atistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses 
 
Next, we explore the question of conditionality. As explained in Section 2, our basic idea is 
that Structural Funds may only be beneficial, if the recipient country uses hem in productive 
projects. However, if they are used to continue intrinsic loss-making activities, they 
                                         
10  We also performed regressions with the Barro-L e human capital data, but the results were less satisfactory 
in terms of statistical significance and goodness of fit. We take this as evidence for the superior quality of the 
data by Doménech and De la Fuente. 
11 l is solved from –0.026*5 = –(1–e–5l). Solving for a and b requires using the first three estimated coefficients 
(see Islam, 1995). 
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obviously will not have a positive effect. We use a measure for institutional quality to control 
for this (the appendix provides the details of this measure). 
Including the interaction term of SF and institutional quality, the results get markedly 
different, as can be seen from comparing the last two columns in Table 3.1. The measure for 
Structural Funds remains negative and becomes significant, whereas the int raction of 
Structural Funds with institutional quality is significantly positive. This suggests that 
economies with good institutional quality benefit from the funds whereas those with bad 
institutions lower their growth performance. That Structur l Funds are only conditionally 
effective is our basic result. In the next section we will perform a robustness check on our 
results by using a wide range of alternative measures to proxy for ‘institutional quality’.  
 
4. Different measures for institutional quality 
The empirical growth literature is frequently plagued by the criticism that ‘everything can be 
shown, provided that ‘good’ proxies are used’. To avoid this kind of critique this section 
presents regression results with different variables that proxy for ‘institutional quality’. By 
using a wide range of proxies, we intend to provide a fair, complete and reliable view on the 
conditional effectiveness of Structural Funds. 
We distinguish three broad groups of institutional quality variables. First, there are 
variables directly related to the outcomes of government policy: inflation and the government 
savings. Although admittedly crude, inflation can be seen as an indication for the degree to 
which governments give in to certain pressures. Central government sa ings indicates the 
extent to which governments absorb financial resources available in a country. Second, we 
have variables that can be summarized as indicating social cohesion: trust, norms of civic 
cooperation and the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The first two proxies are also 
used by, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997), whereas the last one is also used in related 
work by Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997). The third group of indicators tries to 
measure institutional quality directly by using a corruption perception index, openness or an 
institutional quality index. The data appendix discusses the sources and definitions of these 
indicators in more detail. 
Table 4.1 reports the estimation results when different indicato s are used for the 
conditionality factor CONDi in the basic regression equation (results for other proxies are 
available in Appendix B). 
   
 
 8
Table 4.1 Regression results with different measures for institutional quality 
 SF and Inflation SF and Trusta SF and Openness SF and 
Corruption 
Initial GDP per capita  –0.027  (5.3) –0.024  (4.8) –0.025  (4.9) –0.027  (5.3) 
Log of investments  0.024  (2.5) 0.024  (2.4) 0.020  (2.3) 0.020  (2.3) 
Log of human capital 0.018  (1.5) 0.016  (1.3) 0.014  (1.2) 0.019  (1.6) 
Log of population growth + 0.05 –0.037  (1.9) –0.025  (1.3) –0.034  (1.8) –0.028  (1.4) 
Structural Funds –0.184  (1.9) –0.047  (1.4) –0.285  (3.5) –0.112  (3.4) 
SF * Cond (see column header) 0.109  (1.6) 0.002  (1.2) 0.064  (3.1) 0.016  (2.5) 
Constant 0.170  (3.0) 0.187  (3.3) 0.165  (3.1) 0.193  (3.4) 
     
R2-adj. 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.51 
# panel observations 91 84 91 91 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-s atistics (in absolute values) are reported between parenthes s. 
a The ‘trust-variable’ is not available for Greece 
 
A first general remark is that the regression results as far as the effects of savings in physical 
and human capital and (conditional) convergence are concerned are hardly affected by the 
use of different proxies for institutional quality.  
In the first column we report the conditionality of SF aid on inflation.12 The 
interaction term is borderline significant at the 10% level. Hence, the soil for SF aid is more 
fertile if inflation is low. For the gov rnmental budget (detailed results can be found in 
Appendix B) we cannot draw an analogous conclusion; budget deficits are not significantly 
affecting the effectiveness of SF. Of the measures for social cohesion we report only the trust 
variable (the others basically tell the same story). Although the estimated coefficients have 
the same signs as with the other indicators, the impact of social cohesion variables for 
enhancing the effectiveness of SF aid is not significant.  
A different proxy for institutional quality is the degree of openness of a country, i.e. 
the degree in which a country faces foreign competition. Openness is defined as the natural 
logarithm of exports plus imports divided by GDP.13 The basic idea is that this openness 
variable captures the pressure on countries to efficiently use the Structural Funds. Openness is 
– at best – an imperfect proxy,14 but we focus also on this specification because of its greater 
                                         
12 For comparability with the other institutional variables we use four minus the log of average inflation. In that 
case the resulting variable is positive and a higher value reflects higher institutional quality. 
13 We could alternatively use imports (or exports) divided by GDP, but these measures are highly correlated and 
the results are hardly affected by the choice for a particula  proxy. 
14 Openess is a ‘catchall’ variable, because openness also depends on the size of the country. To assess its 
validity in a simple way, we have determined the correlation of our openness variable with the more generally 
accepted openness variable that was constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995) for a much more extensive cross-
section of countries (we did not use the Sachs and Warner index itself, because then almost all EU-countries 
would be labeled as open). The correlation between these two measures of openness is obtained from a simple 
linear regression equation and equals 0.28 (p-value=0.0019). Details are available upon request. 
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data availability for the accession countries. Openness seems to be a good proxy, as it ives 
results comparable to the institutional quality measure in Table 3.1.15
The last two column reports the results for another fairly direct measure of 
institutional quality, viz. corruption. This also gives rise to a roughly similar and highly 
significant result. The same conclusions are reached when we use the Governance Indicators 
constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2002). The results for some of these regressions are 
relegated to Appendix B as these indicators are less widely used than the ones we discuss
here. The evidence therefore clearly suggests that SF aid is more effective in countries with 
high-quality institutions or with a low perceived corruption. 
We consider the specifications with institutional quality and corruption as our 
preferred specifications. As said before, we also use openness as the data availability is 
better. For these three specifications Table 4.2 reports the implied semi-elasticity of the SF 
for different countries discussed above. These semi-elasticities are defined as the derivative 
of the growth rate with respect to the natural logarithm of the Structural Funds (SF). They 
thus measure the increase in the growth rate in response to a 1% increase in the share of 
Structural Funds in GDP. The countries are ordered by the size of elasticity.16 A few 
results stand out. First, in Greece and Portugal the elasticity is negative in all specifications. 
Second, the Southern EU members tend to be clustered around the low and negative values of 
the elasticity whereas the Northern EU members are clustered around the high and positive 
elasticities, representing relatively aid-conducive institutions.17 Third, the current allocation 
of the ERDF is largely focussed on the countries with negative elasticities.18  
 
                                         
15 All three selected specifications have both a significant coefficient for SF as well as for the conditional term. 
16 The elasticities are calculated for all EU countries. We use the observations for the last 5-year period for the 
conditioning variables to calculate the elasticity. The elasticity that is reported in the table is the calculated 
elasticity multiplied by 100. 
17 The annual growth effect of the actually received amount of Structural Funds is, for example, for Ireland 
0.31%-points and for The Netherlands 0.03%-points (derived from the regression equation using institutional 
quality as the conditioning variable). Details on growth effects for all countries and conditioning variables are 
available upon request.  
18 Ederveen et al. (2002) provide an overview of the allocation of the ERDF.
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Table 4.2 Implied semi- lasticities for three specifications 
SF and institutional quality SF and corruption SF and openness 
Greece –1.58 Greece –1.56 Italy –2.90 
Spain –0.31 Italy –1.43 France –2.84 
Portugal –0.16 Belgium –0.33 Germany –2.55 
Italy 0.20 Portugal –0.31 Spain –2.25 
Ireland 0.24 France –0.21 United Kingdom –2.16 
France 1.49 Spain 0.08 Finland –1.90 
United Kingdom 1.58 Ireland 0.44 Greece –1.55 
Austria 1.71 Germany 0.56 Sweden –1.49 
Germany 1.87 Austria 1.01 Denmark –1.04 
Sweden 1.96 United Kingdom 1.56 Portugal –0.45 
Finland 1.98 Luxembourg 1.95 Austria –0.40 
Denmark 2.01 The Netherlands 2.14 The Netherlands 0.76 
Belgium 2.03 Sweden 2.35 Ireland 0.93 
The Netherlands 2.17 Denmark 2.93 Belgium 1.84 
Luxembourg 2.30 Finland 3.32 Luxembourg 3.53 
 
In order to assess the implications of these results for the countries that intend to enter the 
European Union in the (near) future, we have calculated the implied semi-elasticitie  for 
these countries (note that for institutional quality and corruption, we do not have data f r all
accession countries). In interpreting these results, one of course has to keep in mind that these 
results are based on out-of-sample predictions. Care is therefore required in the interpretation. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3. Based on the semi-elasticities for the institutional 
indicators, one has to conclude that the prospects for effective use of structural funds in the 
accession countries are limited. This reflects the fact that the institutional quality and 
perceived corruption in most of these countries are worse than in Greece, which featured the 
lowest values among the EU countries included in our analysis (see Table 4.2). When 
considering the semi- lasticities based on openness, the picture is slightly more positive. 
However, here we have to take into account that openness catches more than the institutional 
quality only. It is well known that small countries tend to be more open; hence the relative 
size of the countries affects the results, as is clear from Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Implied semi-elasticities for accession countries 
SF and institutional quality SF and corruption SF and openness 
Malta  –3.85 Romania –4.62 Turkey –4.08 
Turkey –3.35 Latvia –3.95 Poland –2.76 
Cyprus –2.49 Turkey –3.72 Romania –2.32 
  Slovak Republic –3.61 Hungary –1.28 
  Bulgaria –3.38 Bulgaria 0.09 
  Czech Republic –3.38 Lithuania 0.76 
  Poland –3.16 Czech Republic 0.86 
  Lithuania –2.37 Cyprus 0.91 
  Slovenia –1.91 Latvia 1.05 
  Hungary –1.80 Slovak Republic 1.27 
  Estonia –1.46 Slovenia 1.87 
    Estonia 2.41 
    Malta 3.72 
 
 
5. Robustness analysis 
The results presented so far strongly suggest that the Structural Funds are only conditionally 
effective. However, it may be institutional quality as such, instead of the interaction with 
structural funds that enhances growth. Or the results might simply reflect the extraordinary 
economic performance of Ireland. This section deals with a number of these issues by 
performing an extensive robustness analysis. 
We start from the basic equation with Struc ural Funds conditioned on institutional 
quality. The results are repeated in the first column of Table 5.1. For this specification we add 
different variables, change the sample, use different data sources and account for country- 
and period-specific fixed effects. The results reveal that our major result – Struct ral Funds 
are conditionality effective – is robust to these changes. Furthermore, this conclusion is not 
affected by using different conditionality factors. This is shown in Appendix B, where the 
analysis of this section is repeated with openness instead of institutional quality as the 
conditionality variable. 
The first variation that we consider is the inclusion of the conditioning variable itself 
as it is possible that institutional quality as suchis the driving force behind growth. The 
results, reported in the second column of the table, clearly show that it is not institutional 
quality itself that matters. The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. The other 
coefficients do still support the hypothesis of conditional effectiveness of Structural Funds 
(though the conditionality term is just insignificant at the 5% level). 
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Second, we analyse whether the exceptional growth record of Ireland is driving the 
results. This is investigated in the third column in Table 5.1 by leaving out Ireland. Again the 
results are not very sensitive for this change. 
Third, we disentangle the influence of joining the EU and the receipt of cohesion 
support. Therefore we construct a period dummy variable that equals one when a country was 
a member of the EU in that period, and zero otherwise. Including this dummy variable does 
not weaken the strength of the conditional effectiveness, but nevertheless shows that 
European integration itself tends to contribute to growth (though the estimate is not 
significant). This result suggests that two separate effects are at stake (see Crespo-Cuaresma, 
2001, for a more detailed discussion and empirical analysis of the returns to EU-
membership). 
Fourth, we test whether t e results are driven either by the distinct performance of 
some of the countries under consideration or by different behaviour in different periods of our 
sample, for example because of business cycle effects. These options are tested by including 
country- and period-specific fixed effects in the fifth and sixth column of Table 5.1, 
respectively. The results further reinforce the idea of the Structural Funds being only 
conditionally effective. In the specification with country-specific fixed effects, we see that the 
coefficient of the log of investments becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. This 
reflects the fact that variation over time of investments is limited. The effect of investments is 
therefore mainly picked up by the fixed effects. For human capital the coefficient remains 
stable but is no longer significant. In the specification with period-specific fixed effects, we 
see, however, that the coefficient of the log of human capital becomes very small (though 
insignificant). This reflects the fact that human capital develops similarly in all the countries 
in the sample over time. The effect is therefore picked up by the period-specific fixed 
effects.19  
Fifth, we analyse the sensitivity of the results for the period used in the regression 
analysis. For most countries, the Structural Funds only started to be obtained in the late 
1970s. In the years before, we have set the Structural Funds at zero in our dataset. To check 
the sensitivity of our results for this, we have restricted the time span to 1975-1995. The 
                                         
19 These results obtained by including country- and period specific fixed effects basically illustrate that the 
variation in investments and human capital over time and across countries in the sample of countries that we 
consider in this study is too limited to obtain statistically significant results for investments in physical and 
human capital when including period- and country specific fixed effects.  
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results are reported in the seventh column of Table 5.1. Apart from the reduced statistical 
significance of investments, both the qualitative as well as the quantitative results are hardly 
affected.20    
Sixth, we re- stimate our basic regression equation with data from the Penn World 
Tables (Mark 6.1) that became recently available (instead of using the data from the World 
Development Indicators). The results again confirm our major result: Structural Funds as 
such are not effective in enhancing growth, but they are if they are seeded in fertile soil.
 Finally, the last two specifications are based on the application of recently developed 
GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Blundell and Bond, 1998).21 We refer to 
Bond et al. (2001) for an application to the estimation of empirical growth models and a 
discussion of the various estimation techniques. In the Arellano-Bond appr ach, the 
regression equation is written in the form of a dynamic model. By taking first-differences, 
time-invariant country specific effects are removed. The right-hand-side variables in the first-
differenced equation are instrumented. In doing so, one solves the problem of omitted 
variable biases that are constant over time, parameters are estimated consistently despite the 
endogeneity of right-hand-side variables and it allows for consistent estimation in the 
presence of measurement error. This approach was subsequently refined by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). They introduced a system GMM estimator that is highly recommended for 
empirical growth research (cf. Bond et al., 2001). Both the Arellano-Bond-specification and 
the Blundell-Bond-specification are reported in Table 5.1. The results reveal the well-known 
fact that the estimated speed of convergence is substantially larger in the GMM estimates. 
The effect of structural funds becomes statistically less significant, but remains similar in 
quantitative terms.22 
                                         
20 We have done the entire analysis in this paper for both the period 1975-1995 as well as 1980-1995. Both 
qualitative as well as quantitative results are reasonably robust for changes in the time period. Details are 
available upon request from the authors.  
21 All the GMM estimations were performed with OX version 3.30 and the DPD package version 1.2 (available 
as freeware at www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik). 
22 The implied semi-elasticities range from –1.02 (–1.70) for Greece to 4.96 (2.23) for Luxembourg in the 
Arrelano-Bond (Blundell-Bond) specification.  
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Table 5.1 Regression results: Robustness with institutional quality as conditioning variable. 
 Basic: SF 
and 
Institut. 
Quality 
Institut. 
Quality as 
such 
Excluding 
Ireland 
With 
EU-dummy 
Country 
Specific 
Fixed 
Effects 
Period 
Specific 
Fixed 
Effects 
Period 
1975-1995 
With PWT 
data 
Arellano 
Bond 
Blundell 
Bond 
Log of Initial GDP per capita  –0.028  
(5.7) 
–0.029  
(5.8) 
–0.029  
(5.8) 
–0.030  
(5.9) 
–0.052  
(4.8) 
–0.013  
(2.4) 
–0.025  
(2.7) 
–0.032  
(4.6) 
–0.076 
(2.5) 
–0.069 
(4.3) 
Log of investments  0.020  
(2.3) 
0.020  
(2.4) 
0.020  
(2.4) 
0.023  
(2.6) 
–0.002  
(0.1) 
0.013  
(1.6) 
0.013  
(1.1) 
0.029  
(3.4) 
0.006 
(0.2) 
0.006 
(0.4) 
Log of human capital 0.022  
(2.0) 
0.017  
(1.5) 
0.017  
(1.5) 
0.024  
(2.2) 
0.026  
(0.7) 
0.002  
(0.2) 
0.034  
(2.1) 
0.000  
(0.0) 
0.051 
(0.9) 
0.101 
(2.5) 
Log of pop. growth + 0.05 –0.024  
(1.2) 
–0.024  
(1.2) 
–0.024  
(1.2) 
–0.027  
(1.3) 
–0.026  
(1.2) 
–0.028  
(1.6) 
–0.053  
(1.9) 
–0.036  
(1.6) 
–0.039 
(2.2) 
–0.046 
(1.7) 
Structural Funds –0.141  
(3.3) 
–0.109  
(2.2) 
–0.109  
(2.2) 
–0.140  
(3.3) 
–0.196  
(4.1) 
–0.133  
(3.8) 
–0.124  
(3.0) 
–0.168  
(3.5) 
–0.155 
(1.5) 
–0.139 
(1.8) 
Structural Funds * instit. quality 0.018  
(3.0) 
0.014  
(2.2) 
0.014  
(2.2) 
0.017  
(2.9) 
0.029  
(4.4) 
0.019  
(4.0) 
0.017  
(3.0) 
0.023  
(3.4) 
0.023 
(1.7) 
0.017 
(1.8) 
Institutional Quality itself 
 
0.002  
(1.2)       
  
EU dummy 
   
0.004  
(1.4)     
  
Constant 0.208  
 (3.5) 
0.212  
(3.6) 
0.212  
 (3.6) 
0.214  
(3.6)   
0.056  
(0.7) 
0.266  
(3.7) 
  
           
R2-adj. 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.64 0.68 0.27 0.45   
# panel observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 52 91 78 91 
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-s atistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses. The results of the last two specifications are based on a 
regression equation with the natural logarithm of GDP per capita as dependent variable and are subsequently transformed for reasons of comparability using the fact 
that the growth rate in all specifications in this paper is defined as the dlog divided by five. We report the two-step GMM es imates. Instruments used in the Arellano-
Bond approach are the log of initial income two periods lagged. All other righ-hand-sid  variables are assumed to be exogenous and are instrumented with their own 
value. The additional instrument used in the Blundell-Bond approach is the dlog of initial income one period lagged. The Sargan test does not reject the null-hyp thesis 
of a valid specification. Further details are available upon request. 
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6. Conclusions 
How effective are Structural Funds in promoting economic growth and convergence in the 
Member States of the European Union? Building on a standard neoclassical growth 
framework, we find that European support as such did not improve the countries’ growth 
performance. However, we find evidence that it enhances growth in countries with the ‘right’ 
institutions. This conclusion is in line with the recent empirical findings on the effectiveness 
of aid to less developed countries by Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
The analysis reveals which type of institution matters, as institutions are measured in 
several ways. Social cohesion is not an important conditioning factor. The government policy 
indicators are not significant at the 5% level in determining the effectiveness of the Structural 
Funds. However, when conditioning for openness and the direct measures for institutional 
quality, we find robust and significant conditional effectiven ss of the Structural Funds. So, 
the European policy to promote regional growth is only conditionally effective. This finding 
bears considerable consequences for the (re-)design of the EU cohesion policy in light of the 
enlargement of the EU: the funds are to be allocated toward institution building in the first 
instance! Once the institutions are of a sufficient quality, the funds may be effective in 
stimulating (catching-up) growth. 
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Appendix A: Data23 
Data in the basic regression 
· The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over the respective 5-year inter al (the 
dependent variable) is taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2000, 
CD-Rom). Recently, the newest versio of the Penn World Table – Mark 6.1 – has become 
available, in which a different method is used to construct purchasing power parities. We 
report a robustness check with these data in Section 5. 
· Initial GDP per capita (in constant 1995 dollars) is taken from the World Development 
Indicators.  
· Average gross domestic savings is taken from the World Development Indicators.  
· The human capital variable is taken from De la Fuente and Doménech (2000) and is available 
via the Internet. For a discussion on the quality of these data, see De la Fuente and Doménech 
(2001). We have also experimented with the more commonly used proxies provided by Barro 
and Lee. Details are available upon request. 
· Population growth is taken from the World Development Indicators.  
· Openness is derived from variables in the World Development Indicators. It is defined as 
exports plus imports divided by GDP. In the regressions, we use the natural logarithm of 
openness. To assess its validity as a proxy for institutional quality, we have confronted this 
openness variable with the openness variable from Sachs and Warner (1995) for a more 
extensive set of countries (see footnote 14). 
· In measuring European aid, we restrict attention to the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF). This is by far the most important of the funds and especially meant to help relatively 
poor EU members. Up to 1986, we rely on Vanhove (1999) for ERDF data (source: Official 
Journal of the EC). For the period 1986 onwards, we use data from the Commission 
Accounting System (SINCOM).24 We divided the amount of SF aid by the level of GDP in 
the country. Furthermore, we added one to this share before taking the natural logarithm to 
avoid negative numbers and to avoid problems with countries that received no structural 
funds. We treated the period before countries entered the EU as if they did not receive any 
cohesion support.25 
· The EU dummy equals one if the country is a EU-member, and zero otherwise. For countries 
that entered during the period under consideration, the dummy represents the fraction of the 
time that the country was a member. The years of entry are based on Pelkmans (1997, p. 27). 
                                         
23 The dataset is available at www.henridegroot.net/downloads 
24 See Doménech et al. (2000). We are grateful to Rafael Doménech for maki g them available to us. 
25 The results presented in the main text are not sensitive for this. Details are available upon request. 
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We use data for thirteen EU countries (Austria, Belgium, D nmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) for the period from 1960–
1995. Table A.1 shows summary statistics for some of the main variables of interest in the study.  
 
Table A.1. Summary statistics of the most important data 
 Per Capita GDP in 
1960 (1995 US $) 
Per Capita GDP 
growth (% per year) 
Structural Funds 
(1990; % of GDP) 
Openness 
(export plus import 
as % of GDP) 
Mean 8623 2.9 0.32 60 
Median 9587 2.7 0.04 53 
Standard Deviation 3830 1.7 0.51 27 
 
Alternative proxies for institutional quality 
· The corruption perception index (CPI) is constructed by Transparency International and 
documented in a background paper (Lambsdorff, 2001). 
· Sachs and Warner (1995) provide the institutional quality index (ICRG) used in Section 4.  
· The inflation rate that we use in the same section is from Sachs and Warner (1995). It 
measures the average inflation rate over the period 1965–1990. 
· Central government savings (measured as current revenues minus current expenditures of the 
central government as a fraction of GDP) (CGB) are taken from World Data CD-ROM, 1995. 
We added 10 to this variable to ensure positive values and comparable outcomes in our 
regressions. 
· The variable trust measures the percentage of people that replies ‘most people can be trusted’ 
to the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’. This proxy is used by, for example, Knack 
and Keefer (1997) and derived from the World Value Survey.  
· The norms of civic cooperation are measured by membership of associations or societies and 
is also used by Knack and Keefer (1997).  
· The variable ethnolinguistic fractionalization is based on Taylor and Hudson (1972) an  used 
in, among others, Mauro (1995). 
· We used a number of Governance Indicators from the World Bank’s Composite Indicator 
Dataset Research Project by Kaufmann et al. (2002). These indicators refer to Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law and Control of Corruption and are measured in units ranging from about –2.5 t  2.5, wi h 
higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.  
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Appendix B: Alternative specifications and test for robustness 
In Table B.1 we provide results for alternative measures of institutional quality. The first regression 
complements the first specification in Table 4.1. The latter three specifications use WorldBank 
Governance Indicators to condition for institutio al quality. These specifications confirm that SF are 
conditionally effective and illustrate the robustness of the results reported in the main text. 
 
Table B.1 Regression results with different measures for institutional quality 
 SF and 
government 
budget 
SF and 
WorldBank 
Governance 
Indicator 
‘Political 
Stability’ 
SF and 
WorldBank 
Governance 
Indicator 
‘Government 
Effectiveness’ 
SF and 
WorldBank 
Governance 
Indicator ‘Rule of 
Law’ 
Initial GDP per capita –0.029  (5.4) –0.028  (5.2) –0.026  (5.0) –0.025  (5.1) 
Log of investments 0.019  (2.0) 0.016  (1.6) 0.022  (2.5) 0.022  (2.5) 
Log of human capital 0.024  (1.9) 0.022  (1.8) 0.016  (1.3) 0.015  (1.3) 
Log of population growth + 0.05 – .026  (1.2) –0.024  (1.2) –0.036  (1.8) –0.034  (1.8) 
Structural Funds 0.008  (0.3) –0.088  (3.1) –0.064  (3.6) –0.078  (3.7) 
Structural Funds*cond (see 
column header) 0.007  (0.9) 0.064  (2.0) 0.044  (2.2) 0.063  (2.4) 
Constant 0.203  (3.5) 0.203  (3.6) 0.167  (3.0) 0.169  (3.1) 
     
R2-adj. 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51 
# panel observations 91 91 91 91 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-s atistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses 
 
In Table B.2, we repeat the robustness analysis performed in Section 5, but now with openness as the 
conditioning variable instead of institutional quality. The results confirm our main conclusions. 
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Table B.2 Regression results: robustness analysis 
 Basic: SF 
and 
Openness 
Including 
Openness 
separately 
Excluding 
Ireland 
With 
EU-dumm
y 
Country 
Fixed 
Effects 
Period 
Fixed 
Effects 
Period 
1975-1995 
With PWT 
data 
Arellano 
Bond 
Blundell 
Bond 
Initial GDP per capita  –0.025  
(5.1) 
–0.025  
(5.1) 
–0.025  
(5.1) 
–0.027  
(5.4) 
–0.060  
(5.6) 
–0.010  
(2.0) 
–0.020  
(2.1) 
–0.027  
(3.8) 
–0.079 
(2.6) 
–0.067 
(4.2) 
Log of investments  0.020  
(2.4) 
0.018  
(2.3) 
0.018  
(2.3) 
0.023  
(2.8) 
0.006  
(0.6) 
0.015  
(2.0) 
0.014  
(1.2) 
0.027  
(3.2) 
0.008 
(0.3) 
0.006 
(0.3) 
Log of human capital 0.014  
(1.3) 
0.020  
(1.8) 
0.020  
(1.8) 
0.017  
(1.6) 
0.064  
(1.8) 
–0.006  
(0.6) 
0.020  
(1.2) 
–0.007  
(0.7) 
0.068 
(1.1) 
0.098 
(2.3) 
Log of pop. growth + 0.05 –0.034  
(1.7) 
–0.038  
(1.9) 
–0.038  
(1.9) 
–0.038  
(1.9) 
–0.043  
(2.1) 
–0.041  
(2.5) 
–0.068  
(2.5) 
–0.047  
(2.0) 
–0.042 
(2.4) 
–0.055 
(2.1) 
Structural Funds –0.285  
(3.9) 
–0.336  
(4.3) 
–0.336  
(4.3) 
–0.296  
(4.1) 
–0.416  
(4.9) 
–0.285  
(4.8) 
–0.253  
(3.4) 
–0.290  
(3.4) 
–0.346 
(1.7) 
–0.278 
(0.9) 
Structural Funds * Openness 0.064  
(3.7) 
0.077  
(4.2) 
0.077  
(4.2) 
0.065  
(3.8) 
0.102  
(5.1) 
0.068  
(4.9) 
0.060  
(3.4) 
0.068  
(3.4) 
0.086 
(1.8) 
0.063 
(0.9) 
Openness itself 
 
-0.007  
(1.8)       
  
EU dummy 
   
0.005  
(1.9)     
  
Constant 0.165  
(2.9) 
0.165  
(2.9) 
0.165  
(2.9) 
0.173  
(3.0)   
-0.008  
(0.1) 
0.201  
(2.8) 
  
           
R2-adj. 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.7 0.31 0.44   
# panel observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 52 91 78 91 
See Table 5.1 for notes. 
